



Statement of the Czech Republic

IAEA Board of Governors

Vienna, 6 - 10 March 2023

Agenda item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Mr. Chair,

The Czech Republic fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by Sweden on behalf of the EU.

We express our appreciation to the Director General and the Secretariat for the report of 28 February and for their professional, objective and impartial work under very challenging circumstances. The Czech Republic is deeply concerned by the alarming accelerating escalation of Iran's nuclear programme that gravely departs from its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments. Iran's actions, which have no credible civilian justification in Iran's declared nuclear programme, carry very significant proliferation-related risks.

We are also deeply concerned that for more than two years the Agency's verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran's decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. We reiterate our full support to the IAEA's continuous relentless effort to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

We are extremely concerned by the presence of HEU particles enriched up to 83.7% at the Fordow facility. This is an unprecedented and extremely grave development and we call upon Iran to cooperate fully and without delay with the Agency to clarify its activities regarding enrichment of uranium over 80%.

We strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory and without further delay to return to full compliance with all its nuclear commitments under JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol, and to resume the necessary verification and

monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA, including of all transparency measures. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA, including modified Code 3.1, is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Thank you, Mr. Chair