SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
2023
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Introductory word from the Prime Minister

Dear fellow citizens,

After eight years, the Government presents to you a new Security Strategy. More than ever before, this government document speaks not only to the different levels of our public administration system but to the Government itself, but it reaches out to our civil society and to every individual. It engages the Parliament and recognises its indispensable role in our security. The fact is that we will never be able to safeguard our security interests completely unless every one of us is aware of and willing to do his or her part.

This Security Strategy is uncommonly open in naming the sources of threats and showing how they have forced their way into different aspects of our lives. We believe that to make good decisions, whether in strategic or daily matters, one must be aware of these threats, their reality and their complex interplay. Understanding our security environment will help us become a more resilient society.

This Security Strategy does not gloss over the increasingly dire state of the international security environment. It does not reduce Russia's aggression against Ukraine to a struggle for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It clarifies how the war represents a threat to the international order as a whole. If the West fails in its responsibility to protect that order, it will open the door to potentially even more destructive conflicts.

This Security Strategy shows how external threats, including the risks brought by climate change, directly affect our internal security. The precipitating development of technologies and the cyber and information space, along with our economic dependencies, makes the impacts even more severe.

Czechia's anchoring in international relations; the building, development and appropriate financing of its armed forces; the arrangements we make for our economic, cyber and environmental security; and the way we build a resilient system and society—all these areas require long-term, strategic and interconnected approaches. I am convinced that the new Security Strategy provides a solid groundwork for this holistic understanding of security.

Dear fellow citizens, I am presenting to you a document that is realistic and tells you that happier times are not necessarily just around the corner. Many of you may see security threats, interests, and priorities in a different light than the Government does. I will be very glad if this Security Strategy inspires you to reflect on, and take interest in, our common security.
Dear fellow citizens,

In your hands, you are currently holding the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic; the document says in its very introduction that Czechia is not secure. Nevertheless, in 130 paragraphs it puts forward a complete manual on how we can ensure our security.

To counter hostile operations in cyber, information, economic, and intelligence domains; to face the threat of becoming part of an armed conflict; to be ready to respond to disasters caused by climate change or other anthropogenic events, all of society must engage. This goes for state institutions, local government, civil society as well as individuals.

The strategy also reminds us that security requires investment. Sufficient expenditures on defence and diplomacy, which is an integral part of the security system. Major security threats, including to home security, come from abroad. It is diplomacy that warns about risk developments abroad, shapes the international environment to defend our security interests, and builds alliances and partnership ties, which are necessary and priceless for a medium-sized country like Czechia.

I would like to use this opportunity to thank my colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all other institutions that took the work on the new Czech Security Strategy very seriously and pulled their forces together to cover all aspects of our complex security environment. I would also like to thank the Prime Minister, members of the government, and other senior officials for the political courage to present the current threats and challenges with openness, which is not common to many Czech strategic documents.

I would also like to thank you, my fellow citizens, for your willingness to give the Security Strategy the attention it deserves, and to follow it in your daily lives.

Jan Lipavský
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic
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• Czechia is not secure. The main source of the threats is the much deteriorated international situation.

• Russia’s war against Ukraine has put an end to the period of peace, stability, and cooperation enjoyed by Europe after the end of the Cold War.

• Russia acts deliberately against Czechia’s political, economic, and social stability. It poses a fundamental threat to our security.

• China calls into question the international order. This has adverse implications for Euro-Atlantic security.

• Russia and China share the same interest – to weaken the influence and unity of democratic countries. This systemic competition is of a long-term nature.

• Czechia must be able to withstand hostile influences in the cyber, information, economic, and intelligence spheres.

• Czechia must prepare thoroughly for the possibility that it could become part of an armed conflict.

• Czechia must be prepared to deal with emergencies and crisis situations, including long-term crises, caused by climate change or extraordinary human-made events.

• Europe’s security is interlinked with the security and stability in its neighbourhood.

• NATO and EU membership is of critical importance to Czechia. A threat to an ally is a threat to Czechia.

• Citizens are contributors to security and not just its consumers. A crucial task for the Government is to prepare them for this role.

• The only answer to today’s complex threats is a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.

• Czechia, together with its allies, will make itself secure. However, we will need to invest in every aspect of our security.
I. Introduction

1. The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (“the Security Strategy”) is the fundamental document of our security policy and a frame of reference for other strategies and policies relating to our security. It sets out the core principles and directions of our security policy that are binding on all bodies of the State and public administration. The Security Strategy is to serve as guidance for strategic decisions as well as for daily work on all levels of our security system, including the very basic ones. Its implementation will be regularly reviewed in cooperation with the competent authorities.

2. The Security Strategy is the Government’s document drawn up in consultation with the Office of the President of the Czech Republic and the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The aim was to seek non-partisan approaches to security issues. The authors also received input from the Czech security community, including its non-governmental as well as government sections. The principal frameworks of reference were the NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass; these crucial documents were adopted at the highest level in the two organisations during 2022. The Security Strategy is aligned with the Strategic Framework Czech Republic 2030, a document that sets out an overall strategic vision and goals for Czechia’s development in the long-term horizon.

3. The Security Strategy is based on the values and legal standards enshrined in our constitutional legislation: the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Constitutional Act No. 130/1998 concerning the security of the Czech Republic as amended, and other legislation implementing constitutional standards. Furthermore, the Security Strategy reflects our commitments to our allies and other international commitments arising from the Czechia’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

4. The Security Strategy mostly respects the established structure of its predecessors adopted in 2003, 2011 and 2015. The logic is to look at our comparatively stable security interests in the context of the dramatically changing security environment. The confrontation tells us which strategy is best suited to promote our security interests here and now; and the strategy, in turn, tells us in general terms which tools we should use. In departure from the previous documents, the authors included a new chapter on areas of strategic concern where further policy work will be needed.

5. The watchword of this Security Strategy is a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. Each of us must do his or her part for our security. With this in mind, the authors made an effort to make this Security Strategy straightforward and easy to read.

II. Security policy principles of the Czech Republic

6. Our security policy is grounded in enduring democratic values and principles. The security of individuals and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms remain at the core.

7. To deliver security for individuals, we need functioning State institutions, public administration systems, and crisis management and civil protection mechanisms. The crucial enabler is societal resilience and everyone’s readiness to take a share of responsibility for his or her own security as well as for the security of others. The security of a State is closely interlinked with the security of all its people. No security policy will ever work unless the people become interested and involved. Moreover, the security of today’s Czechia and its people is inseparable from the security of the EU Member States and NATO’s collective defence system.

8. The Government of the Czech Republic (“the Government”), State bodies, the integrated rescue system (including its core and other elements) and all local government bodies are obliged to provide security for our people, to defend our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to safeguard the constituent elements of a democratic rule of law. Their institutional tool for this purpose is a comprehensive, functioning, and resilient security system which anticipates and flexibly responds to the security situation in Czechia and worldwide. The system hinges on close cooperation among all its actors, working together with civil society and the academic and private sectors.

9. The present security environment requires a holistic understanding of and approach to the different areas and aspects of security. Internal security is inseparable from external security. Security in real space is inseparable from security online. The security of our State is inseparable from the security of our society and from the security of every individual.

10. Czechia associates its security with active participation in NATO’s collective defence system based on a strong transatlantic link, and with the development of all areas of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Membership of international organisations does not relieve the Czechia of its primary responsibility for its own defence and security. Moreover, the Czechia often has to reach out far beyond its borders to protect its security interests.

11. Czechia continues to prioritise active prevention of armed conflicts. This involves the use of deterrence as well as preventive diplomacy. In situations of crisis or armed conflict, we work towards political and diplomatic settlement. If this fails, Czechia may use force to protect its vital and, when necessary, strategic interests in accordance with its constitutional legislation, other national laws and regulations, the principles of the UN Charter, and within the framework of our solidarity and commitments to allies. Czechia prefers cooperation in international organisations, arrangements promoting peaceful dispute settlement, a collective approaches to security and defence and mutually advantageous economic and technological cooperation.

12. Economic security (including energy, raw material, food, and trade policies) is an integral part of our national security. It is the linchpin of a functioning economic system and State. We can achieve economic security only if we work towards it within the strategic framework of our EU and NATO membership, and if we maintain an active, transparent and strategically justified international engagement. The State now plays a much stronger role in preventing economic dependencies with their potentially serious security implications. Economic security needs a secure and innovative internal economic environment, preservation and development of strategic industries, resilient infrastructure, openness to international trade and investment cooperation with credible partners, and a secure, affordable, and reliable supply of raw materials.
13. The evolving security environment, including its climate-related changes, puts more pressure on societal resilience and requires us to adapt our security system to new threats. Czechia takes steps to improve its emergency prevention, readiness and response, and to further develop its integrated rescue system, civil protection, and crisis management mechanisms.

14. The security system has to respond to all kinds of threats, and the quality of the response is conditional on constant improvement in each part of the system. Czechia’s security and defence capability must be underpinned by economically strong, technologically advanced, and innovative defence and security industries, engaging in diversified international cooperation with reliable partners. The production capacities and capabilities (including access to raw materials and technologies) must be strong enough to keep our core defence and security structures supplied in times of peace as well as in crisis and conflict.

III. Security interests of the Czech Republic

15. Czechia classifies its security interests (“the interests”) according to their importance. This Security Strategy divides the interests into three categories: vital, strategic, and other important interests.

16. Vital interests. Our vital interest is to ensure the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the Czech Republic, and to preserve (in form as well as in fact) all constituent elements of the democratic rule of law, including the protection and safeguards of fundamental human rights and freedoms for our people. Protection of the vital interests of our State and its people is the first duty of the Government and all public authorities. To protect and defend its vital interests, Czechia is ready to use all legitimate tools and all means to hand.

17. Strategic interests. The advancement of our strategic interests serves our vital interests and helps safeguard the social development and prosperity of Czechia. To promote them, we use approaches and means appropriate for the given situation. The strategic interests of our State include

- accommodating, operational, and cohesive NATO, based on a firm transatlantic link, capable to deter and resist a technologically advanced adversary thanks to its effective and credible nuclear deterrence capability, along with its other capabilities;
- a united, operational, and stable EU, working jointly to help build a democratic, socially just, and economically prosperous community of countries pursuing open trade policies and championing human rights and freedoms;
- security and stability, above all in the Euro-Atlantic space and promotion of international stability and the rules-based order;
- building technologically advanced and prepared armed forces for our own as well as collective defence and preserving and developing our defence and security industry to ensure a secure supply of the necessary materials and services to our armed forces;
- safeguarding our internal security, including the integrated rescue system, civil protection, crisis management, and protection of critical infrastructure;
- protecting the institutions of the democratic rule of law;
- safeguarding Czechia’s economic security, including energy security, preserving and developing our strategic industries, and improving the competitiveness of our strategic industries in international markets;
- safeguarding Czechia’s communication security, information security, and cyber security and defence and safeguarding an open, stable, and secure cyber space;
- systematically reducing our dependence on actors who pose a threat to Czechia ensuring that economic coercion by such actors does not affect the Czechia’s sovereign acts and decisions;
- diversified, reliable, and affordable supply of minerals, nuclear fuel, and other necessary input for critical infrastructure and industrial production and maintaining an adequate level of the State’s material reserves.
- NATO–EU strategic unity, complementary development of their defence and security capabilities, and the ability of NATO and the EU to stay ahead of the technological game;
- diversifying our population’s resilience and active role in security and fostering and building social cohesion and stability;
other important interests serves our vital and
tant interests include namely the following:

• promoting and safeguarding technological
development, with special regard to emerg-
ing and disruptive technologies;

• safeguarding food security: promoting
sustainable agriculture and the local food
industry and maintaining an adequate level
of the State’s food reserves;

• safeguarding environmental security, with
special regard to environmental protection
and ecosystem services, sound manage-
ment of natural resources, climate change
mitigation, and management of climate
change impacts;

18. Other important interests. The advancement of
other important interests serves our vital and
strategic interests. It also improves our society’s
resilience to security threats. Our other impor-
tant interests include namely the following:

• developing bilateral relations with neigh-
bour, with the other EU Member States,
with the United States and the United
Kingdom;

• an independent Ukraine, firmly anchored in
Euro-Atlantic structures, capable of resist-
ing Russia’s great power ambitions;

• building our political, economic, and secu-
ritv relations with democratic Asian and
Oceanian partners to prepare Czechia for
a potential strategic shock in the event of a
conflict in the Asia-Pacific region;

• the UN retaining its global stabilising role:
improved efficiency of the UN, achievement
of the Sustainable Development Goals, and
cooperation with partners and like-minded
countries;

• preparedness for emergencies and crisis
 situations, both natural and human-made;

• promoting and developing regional
cooperation;

• promoting democracy, human rights, fun-
damental freedoms, and the principles of
the rule of law worldwide;

• promoting equal opportunities and main-
streaming the perspectives of vulnerable
and disadvantaged groups into security
agendas at home and worldwide;

• reducing crime, most importantly violent,
economic, organised, and cyber crime along
with fighting corruption;

• fostering a tolerant civil society and sup-
pressing extremism and its root causes;

• transforming our education system to
provide more space for cyber and infor-
mation literacy, including critical thinking,
self-protection, and mutual help skills for
emergencies and crisis situations;

• improving the efficiency and security of dig-
italisation processes in State bodies and the
public administration system and improving
the expertise of civil servants responsible
for tasks with security implications.

IV. Security environment

19. The open conflict caused by Russia in Europe, the
joint anti-systemic drive of Russia and China, the
increasing global tension, and the precipitous
pace of technological development – all of these
grows a situation where the long deterioration
of our security environment may culminate dra-
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photo: Fire rescue service of the Czech republic

matically. The preparedness of the Western world
(including Czechia) for an intensive multidimen-
sional conflict is the factor that determines what
Europe and the world would look like in the com-
ing decades.

Characteristics of the security
environment

20. Europe has seen a reversion to the use of armed
force for political and ideological ends. The risk
of a direct military threat to Czechia’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity remains low. Even so, the
likelihood of a military attack on our territory is
at its highest since the end of the Cold War, espe-
cially in the context of a wider conflict or global
strategic competition.

21. Global strategic competition has picked up
pace. The democratic world is confronted with
pragmatic groupings of countries seeking to
transform the international rules-based order.
The role of the UN as a protector of the order
keeps losing traction. The tendency to assert
one’s interests by force means a danger to the
positions of smaller and weaker states. This
radically increases the significance of Czechia’s
NATO and EU membership.

22. Our security environment develops ever more
rapidly and less predictably. The worst-case
scenario would be an escalation flaring up and
spreading out of control. Tensions between States
are growing; rivalry takes the place of coopera-
tion when threats are in the air. Polarisation
between the order and anti-systemic trends
becomes a reality, globally as well as within our
societies.

23. Internal security and external security
are increasingly interlocked. Our security
environment is multi-layered and interrelated–
in the geographic sense as well as in terms of the
range of areas that make up our security and, as
such, may become a source, object, or instru-
ment of hostile activity. Security cuts across
many areas of critical importance to our society’s
overall cohesion and resilience: economy, energy,
and technology, as well as culture, environment,
education, healthcare, and social ties at large.
It is because of globalization and interconnected
supply chains, including in strategic industries,
that we and our allies feel the repercussions of
a security threat even if the threat itself occurs
far from our borders. Climate change with its
significant impacts is a catalyst of threats, nat-
ural and human-made, that impair our security
environment and may plunge us into political
and security instability.

24. Confrontation and rivalry have found their way
into new areas. Just as the lines between peace
and conflict are blurring, so are the lines between
operational domains. The danger of a conflict is
now a reality not just in the established domains
– on land, at sea, and in the air – but also in cyber
and outer space. Our economy, the very functioning of our state and the security of our people are increasingly dependent on outer space data and services. We are vulnerable to any harmful interference with outer space objects and systems, whether caused by the irresponsible actions of strategic rivals or by collisions among the rapidly growing number of orbital objects. In cyber space, our adversaries attack our critical infrastructure and institutions, seize our sensitive data, undermine the stability and functioning of our strategic information and communication systems, and steal our intellectual property. Attacks on international energy and telecommunication infrastructures, including seabed infrastructures, have revealed the high vulnerability of these installations.

25. Technologies gain strategic importance: our democratic world must stay ahead in the technology race. This is crucial to our security, especially in the area of emerging and disruptive technologies such as AI, quantum technologies, autonomous systems, and biotechnologies. Development and production of technologies strategically important to our defence industry—and indeed to our whole economy—is concentrated in a few facilities in locations vulnerable to conflicts and natural disasters. We increasingly risk becoming dependent on supplies of strategic raw materials and on global supply chains. Our rivals misuse new technologies more and often in a bid to undermine the international rules-based order.

Security threats and sources of instability

26. Russia is the biggest immediate and long-standing direct threat to the security of Europe and to the international rules-based order. Russia seeks to retain and expand its sphere of influence in Europe and beyond, whether by means of political and economic coercion, information and influence operations or, more recently, by a massive use of force. It continues to treat Central Europe as its natural sphere of influence. It has questioned the right of sovereign countries to choose and change their allies. It has deliberately destabilised countries in its neighbourhood, in the Western Balkans, Middle East, and on the African continent. Russia’s war in Ukraine, its aggression and its ambitions, cause a significant buildup of tension in the Black and Baltic Sea regions and the Arctic.

27. Russia uses a broad range of hybrid operations targeting Czechia’s interests and security. Its non-military activities attempt to undermine confidence in democratic institutions and destabilise our society and economy. Unless Russia goes through a fundamental and deep transformation, political as well as social, it will remain a threat to European space no matter what outcome the war in Ukraine may have. Exhausted by the conventional conflict, Russia will become increasingly reliant on nuclear capabilities to defend its position as a great power. This is also why it continues with the modernization of its nuclear weapons and their carriers.

28. China poses a fundamental systemic challenge globally and also in terms of direct influence operations in democratic countries, including Czechia. It makes increasingly vigorous efforts to push through its interests by attempting to change the existing international order. It continues with massive arming and building of military capabilities, including nuclear forces. It engages in cyber espionage, seeks to control global data flows, and uses diverse forms of socio-economic coercion and other hybrid interference tools. Chinese companies are, in effect, tied to the Chinese state and ready to serve its aims.

29. There is a mounting tension between China and some other countries in the region. A potential regional conflict would affect the security situation in Europe and threaten to set off global military escalation. It would also have implications for Czechia’s economic and technological security. The risk factors include Chinese investment in Czech and European critical infrastructure, China’s domination of strategic supply chains, its control of the key commodities, and the way it develops emerging and disruptive technologies, especially AI, with no regard for ethical rules and international standards. China sets out to rewrite the standards. It engages in disinformation activities and challenges the narrative accepted in the international community as a consensual or at least prevailing view. China fails to adequately protect intellectual property rights, and it misuses the instruments of scientific and academic cooperation.

30. Yet another long-term threat comes from the other countries that similarly stand in opposition to the international rules-based order. Some of them have (or seek to acquire) nuclear weapons. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has stepped up its ballistic missile testing, declared itself a nuclear weapons State, and reserved the right to launch a preventive strike. The Islamic Republic of Iran has long been undermining regional stability by its aggressive campaign to expand its sphere of influence by military means. It systematically develops strategic offensive military technologies and nuclear research activities with the apparent aim to build nuclear weapons.

Iran is an active supporter of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

31. The Western Balkans remains a source of instability despite the progress made by its countries on the path to NATO and the EU. Western Balkan countries are important partners to the Czech Republic and the EU as a whole. However, the internal situation in some of them is fragile, and the countries, just like their ethnic groups, have too many outstanding issues in their mutual relationships. The Western Balkans is a region where Euro-Atlantic values and orientation come under the adverse influence of Russia, China, and the Gulf countries.

32. Czechia’s security is endangered by active conflicts and lasting instability in the Middle East, Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. These threats can be terrorism, violent radicalism, forced displacement, and illegal EU-bound migration. Russia has long been destabilising the two regions—deploying private paramilitary companies, conducting manipulative information campaigns, and fomenting of anti-Western sentiment. Russia intends to promote non-liberal governance, undermine stabilisation efforts, and weaken the EU’s position. Some of the countries are becoming dependent on Chinese investments, which is an additional threat. Climate change also has severe impacts on security and stability in the regions.

33. Decline of democracy and the rule of law in any EU Member State would cause internal instability within the EU. The unity, cohesion, and respect for fundamental principles would falter. This would have a damaging effect on the security of Czechia.

34. Non-State actors are another source of direct threats to Czechia’s security, ranging from acts of terrorism and violent extremism to activities eroding and dismantling the rule of law from the inside. Non-State actors exploit the opportunities and freedoms offered by the democratic rule of law, using them to engage in crime, disrupt public order, and commit acts of violence. Organized crime is an important security threat;
in combination with corrupt practices, it may undermine the foundations of our society and destabilise our State. Another threat is the development and spread of dual-use technologies enabling non-state actors to operate in domains where they formerly had little or no access, such as in the air, at sea and in cyber space.

35. An additional security threat is unmanaged and uncontrolled migration, both legal and illegal. This is a situation where the State cannot efficiently control the migration flow and screen the people entering its territory. A third country may deliberately increase an illegal migration flow to serve its hostile purposes. Failed or deficient integration of immigrants is also a threat as it promotes the rise of self-segregated immigrant communities with parallel power structures, and the attendant risks of societal fragmentation and the rise of xenophobia, intolerance, and extremism.

36. Climate change and the worsening state of the environment affects Czechia’s security. Extreme weather events and human-made disasters pose a risk to our people’s safety, life, health, property, and environment, as well as to the economy of our State including supplies of raw materials, water, and food. Disasters may destroy or compromise critical infrastructure and impede the basic functions of the State. The question of environmental migration is also relevant to Czechia’s security.

37. The spread of infectious diseases with a pandemic potential poses a direct threat to the lives and health of Czechia’s population. It makes our people more vulnerable, including psychologically; it depletes the human resources we need to maintain our defence capability and to operate our critical infrastructure and other important public services. What is more, global health crises may impair international economic relations, which may have significant geopolitical impacts. A health crisis may be misused deliberately in geopolitical competition.

38. State and non-state actors may endanger Czechia’s security by hybrid interference targeting the vulnerabilities of our democratic society. Their synergic use of cyber, disinformation, economic, political, diplomatic, military, intelligence, and other tools seeks to disrupt democratic processes, the functioning of democratic institutions, and mechanisms of the rule of law, as well as our internal security and social cohesion. It may compromise the functioning and security of our communication and information systems, supply chains, and critical infrastructure, including the supply of critical raw materials, food and energy commodities. The severity and scope of hybrid interference keeps increasing with the development of new technologies including AI.

39. The pressure on Czechia’s economic security grows. The quality of our internal and external economic environment is at risk. Dangerous economic actors may compromise the functioning of our important infrastructure, gain access to our sensitive data, rob our businesses of unique technological know-how, or bar them from accessing crucial resources. They step up the pressure on our private as well as public sectors, which places increased demands on the resilience of the system and each of its components. Their drive to harm us in the economic sphere may impair the competitiveness and functioning of our economy.

40. Cyber threats take advantage of the vulnerabilities in our information and communication systems. The greatest source of danger are targeted attacks by foreign state and state-sponsored actors, often covered up by plausible denial. International organisations are attractive targets, whether because the attackers want to demonstrate their geopolitical views, or because of the large amounts of sensitive data held by the organisations. Originators of cyber threats may cause considerable asymmetric damage in cyber space. The situation and activities in cyber space are completely interrelated with crises and events in the physical space. A large-scale cyber attack may trigger NATO’s collective defence.

41. The use of conventional military force against the Czechia’s territory is a possibility. Czechia may become involved in a military conflict especially in the event of an attack against its allies. It cannot be ruled out that allies, including Czechia, will be compelled to conduct a high-intensity defence operation against a technologically advanced attacker possessing nuclear weapons and other advanced weapon systems. Our territory may be directly threatened mainly by enemy air forces, ballistic missiles, UAS, and by diversion and sabotage operations of intelligence services.

42. The use of nuclear weapons against Czechia’s territory is unlikely. However, the risk would increase if the nuclear taboo were broken, even with a very low-yield nuclear attack, in Ukraine or anywhere else. Global nuclear confrontation would be fatal for Czechia, but this risk remains low. The architecture of the global strategic balance is crumbling because of Russia’s disregard for treaty-based commitments and China’s unwillingness to get involved. International mechanisms have been unable to prevent the proliferation crises associated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran. Nuclear deterrence is an active element of Russia’s tactics in its war against Ukraine.
43. The chemical weapons ban has been broken by non-state actors and some states, namely Russia and Syria. Moreover, research and development in the fields of nuclear energy, nuclear chemistry, and nuclear biology is essentially of a dual use nature, which means that it is vulnerable to misuse for military purposes. China and Russia have thwarted the long-standing international cooperation in the peaceful use of the results of this research as, from their perspective, the existing control mechanisms do not serve the interests of their armament programmes.

44. States may assert their interests through non-state actors. One example is the private military and security companies contracted by governments or serving on a commercial basis. Today, Russia, most of all, resorts to military contractors and demonstrably uses their services in Ukraine, in the Middle East and in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Transregional criminal organisations provide mobility for terrorism, human smuggling, and the smuggling of prohibited goods including WMDs.

45. Terrorism is an important asymmetric threat originating from both state and non-state actors. Czechia is not a major target for international terrorist groups—that said, we are part of the Western world and as such we may come under terrorist attack. In any case, terrorist attacks occurring in the other EU Member States are a threat to Czechia: they may endanger our nationals, disrupt vital European infrastructure, and compromise the EU’s shared security interests. A terrorist attack on industrial facilities or pipelines may seriously affect human health, the environment, or the functioning of our economic system.

46. Natural and human-made disasters are an ever-present security threat. Climate change has increased the incidence and intensity of natural disasters. The causes are normally beyond human control. However, in many cases, humans can manage disasters and make them happen less frequently thanks to systematic long-term preparation, planning, adaptation, and efforts to reverse or prevent the root causes. Severe impacts of natural disasters are partly the result of human carelessness, ignorance, denial of scientific evidence, and desire to secure an advantage here and now rather than invest in prevention, preparedness, and systemic solutions in the longer term. A natural disaster may be caused by compound hazards. Interaction between the hazards makes the impacts more severe and complicates disaster response.

47. Czechia’s security is integral and indivisible. It requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. This is the starting point for the work of each public authority as well as for mutual coordination, including civil-military cooperation. To be successful, the strategy promoting our security interests must be taken on board by the whole of society.

48. The strategy promoting our security interests requires us to prevent, suppress, and mitigate the impacts of security threats, as well as to build our systemic, economic, societal, and environmental resilience. Resilience means the ability to withstand adverse influences, to cope in adverse situations and to overcome crises. We need to be more resilient to a whole range of hostile interference, including those that foster societal tensions. This involves protecting our critical infrastructure, improving our information and cyber security, dealing with the impacts of new, emerging and disruptive technologies, safeguarding our economic security (including energy security), and defending ourselves against terrorism. Our citizenship education curricula must help raise awareness of security threats, improve our response capability, and build our resilience.

49. To safeguard the security of our State we consistently develop an efficient national decision-making process, as well as cooperation with international organisations. The functioning and efficiency of our decision-making process is tested in regular exercises. The process involves democratic control of the armed forces, a functioning crisis management system, and an efficient communication system (including secure government communications). It is supported by interconnected non-military and military information systems.

50. Czechia’s security interests may require us to give the State a stronger role to play in the market and in free competition. This may become necessary in order to provide security for our cyber space, energy sector (including raw material supply), and for other sectors of strategic importance to the security of our State, our economy, and our people. To make the security system work for us, it is critically important that the relevant ministries exercise the State’s shareholder rights in state-owned strategic companies, namely in the energy and fuel sectors, and in areas such as promotion of export and trade.

51. Our State needs to maintain efficient strategic communication in order to promote our security interests in today’s accelerated and globalised communication environment. The communication targets the domestic as well as international, public, foreign partners and adversaries of Czechia. Efficient and timely strategic communication may prevent or mitigate the impacts of security threats. It plays a crucial part in deterring enemies and gaining allies. What is more, it gives our people better insight into the security policy and other public policies to build their confidence in the State and public institutions.

52. An essential part of the work that must be done to build our societal resilience is to counteract disinformation, information operations, and attempts to manipulate the information space—especially when undertaken for the benefit of a state actor who seeks to undermine the democratic character and security of our State. To defend ourselves successfully, we need to take a holistic approach: to combine our promotion of media and information literacy and support
for a strong civil society with the State’s strategic communication and with the development of threat detection and analysis capacities, efficient cooperation and coordination among the relevant state institutions, and cooperation within the EU and NATO.

53. Czechia needs to develop a more holistic and united response to threats. It is important to develop our capability to attribute attacks, threats, and hostile actions directed against Czechia. This will enable us to target our response and assert our values with greater accuracy. To this end, we will obtain and gather data, and build expert analysis capacities.

54. To efficiently manage emergencies, and crisis situations (both human-made and natural) endangering lives, health, property, and the environment, it is essential to make sure that every element of the integrated rescue system remains operational. The great demands placed on preparedness of the system are proportionate to the high incidence and considerable impacts of emergencies. The Government of the Czech Republic will facilitate the provision of equipment for the integrated rescue system, as well as the building of civil protection and crisis management systems, and cooperation between the actors involved.

Collective dimension of defence and security

55. Czechia’s defence hinges on our participation in the collective defence system of NATO—the only organisation genuinely ready and capable to defend the territories, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of its members. Czechia takes an active part in efforts to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture against any adversary in all operational domains—on land, at sea, in the air, as well as in cyber space and outer space. NATO, just like Czechia, pays special attention to the defence capability of the Alliance’s eastern flank. Czechia will bolster its defence capability so as to be a responsible and credible ally contributing its adequate share to NATO collective defence.

56. Due to its geographic location, Czechia, as a transit country, is likely to play an important role in deterrence and collective defence in the context of collective defence operations and efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. We will have to take a great deal of responsibility for supporting the allied forces in our own territory.

57. The European Union makes decisive contributions to Czechia’s security in the broad sense. It is in our interest that the EU should be a strong political and security actor. We support efforts to reinforce the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and, within its framework, to develop all areas of the Common Security and Defence Policy while respecting the complementary approach to NATO’s key role in collective defence. Czechia promotes a consistent growth of EU-NATO cooperation, as well as the development of the EU-United States security dialogue. Strategic unity in the trans-Atlantic community is the cornerstone of the defence of the values of our democratic world and the international order based on them.

58. The EU’s unique strength in addressing external conflicts and crises lies in its ability to combine civilian and military means. Czechia supports the EU’s drive to improve its capability to decide and act promptly, assertively, and flexibly in order to manage different aspects of crises and conflicts. The EU is our key platform for coordinated prevention and response to a broad range of security threats such as climate change and illegal migration. Czechia takes an active part in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and supports efforts to reduce disaster risk.

59. The essential tool of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy are restrictive measures—sanctions. Their purpose is to protect the EU’s values, fundamental interests and security, and to lessen the ability of hostile regimes to harm our interests or the interests of our allies. Czechia’s new legislation concerning national restrictive measures enables us to create our own national sanctions list in cases where the EU fails (or takes too long) to agree on its restrictive measures.

60. Cooperation among EU members, NATO members, and other allies is an essential part of the drive to improve the security, resilience, and transparency of our interconnected economic environment, and to counteract the shared threats to economic security. It is important that we all coordinate the steps we are taking to safeguard our energy, raw material, and food security (including adequate strategic reserves of the State), to build our resilience and protect critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, and to screen foreign investors and suppliers of critical infrastructure components. Just as importantly, we must align our perceptions of the risks, and improve and/or preserve the capabilities and production capacities of our strategic industries (including the defence industry) necessary for our State’s strategic reserves. Cooperation among EU and NATO members also plays a significant part in improving and/or preserving the capabilities and production capacities of our strategic industries, including the defence industry. It helps reduce critical dependencies in strategic economic sectors, and strengthen the diversity and resilience of supply chains. The key is to diversify in order to lessen our dependence on a limited range of sources.

61. What is important for Czechia’s security in the global context is that international rules, standards and cooperation-based institutions must be kept in place, and that the international community must respond robustly when force is being used in breach of the UN Charter. Czechia and its like-minded UN partners work consistently to safeguard peace and security, to draw political and other consequences from breaches of international law, and to defend democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

62. Czechia takes an active part in preventing and combating terrorism. We contribute to the counter-terrorism activities of international organisations, above all NATO and the EU, by sharing intelligence, building the requisite capabilities, participating in operations and missions, and promoting cooperation with partners. Czechia assists its partner countries in developing their capability to deal with the threats of terrorism and radicalisation on the ground, to address the root causes and, importantly, to promote good governance and socio-economic development in vulnerable regions. Our assistance helps prevent the dangerous rise of terrorism and radicalisation including the possible impacts on our society. Czechia has adopted
system-wide preventive and legislative measures against terrorism in accordance with EU strategy. We actively prevent, detect and suppress radiations, even if they remain outside the scope of our border protection, and our fight against terrorist financing and terrorist use of new technologies.

63. Czechia has in place arrangements necessary for active participation in NATO, EU and UN missions and one-off coalitions dealing with a broad range of crises in the pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases. We fulfill these commitments in conformity with our integrated approach to crisis management operations. We assist with the building of security and defence capacities in our partner countries whose security and resilience is relevant to the security interests of Czechia. To this end, we develop the capability to deploy our armed forces and civilian experts on capacity building missions and operations, focused on building security and defence capabilities especially in carrying out training missions and supplying of materials.

64. When crisis prevention and peaceful settlement fail, Czechia joins in the coercive measures in keeping with its NATO and EU commitments and with the principles of the UN Charter. Moreover, where our capacities permit, we may contribute civilian and military resources to other peace operations that are consistent with our interests, even if they remain outside the scope of our treaty-based commitments and/or if they do not address a direct threat to Czechia. We are ready to contribute to the international community’s coercive measures intended to prevent gross violations of human rights, and above all genocide and other crimes against humanity. In this connection, the Czech Republic supports further elaboration of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept adopted by the UN General Assembly. However, this must never be to the detriment of the defence of Czechia and our adequate participation in NATO collective defence.

Foreign policy and diplomacy

65. Almost all diplomatic tools used to advance security interests are within the soft power spectrum. This does not lessen their importance as an integral part of the overall strategy.

66. Diplomacy is an essential element of our security system. It works over longer time scales to create an environment conducive to the vital interests of our State. Its core task is to defend and promote a stable, peaceful, and just international order and to forge alliances with like-minded countries. Diplomacy helps advance our security interests by building partnerships and confidence, gathering timely and relevant information, detecting dangerous trends as they emerge abroad, and taking preventive diplomatic action to cool down tensions. Czechia uses its engagement in international organisations, and its bilateral and regional cooperation, to promote its security interests.

67. Czechia is active in human rights advocacy and promotion of democracy. We are convinced that, by its nature, a country with a poor human rights record poses a security threat to others and to the international community as a whole. A regime that violates human rights in its own territory is much more likely to commit acts of aggression outside its borders. The projects and activities of Czechia’s transition cooperation programme in priority countries are based on partnerships with local civil society, NGOs, public administration, and the media. They are always tailored to the local conditions and the needs of the country concerned.

68. Development and humanitarian assistance is an important and established part of efforts to reduce the security risks that originate from failed and vulnerable countries. We assist through multilateral formats as well as bilaterally. We seek to interlink our humanitarian, stabilisation and development activities in a way that consistently reduces vulnerabilities and contributes to all dimensions of resilience, including especially the humanitarian, security and environmental ones. The tools of development and humanitarian assistance are also important in mitigating the impacts of environmental and climate threats and in advancing global health above all in the areas of prevention, preparedness and adaptation.

69. Our diplomatic service uses consular tools, preventive measures, and crisis management to lessen the risks to Czech nationals abroad. Digitalisation of our consular system will make the service even more efficient.

70. Control of trade in military material, dual use goods and other sensitive material is another crucial tool of the Czech Republic’s foreign and security policy.

71. Czechia plays an active part in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts. We seek to reverse the ongoing erosion of the disarmament architecture. We consider it necessary that, in international forums, responses to this situation should be directed against Russia and, from now on, also against China with its wholly, non-transparent modernisation and diversification of its nuclear arsenal. Czechia is against non-systemic initiatives calling for a complete ban on nuclear weapons, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), as these initiatives are not consistent with the operative Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Czechia places an emphasis on third country engagement in international control regimes. We do not accept the argument that these regimes act as a brake on the development of the global South. The EU, first of all, should strive harder for a more assertive control of sensitive exports; this should involve a search for effective capabilities and activities to complement the demarches carried out by EU Delegations. Czechia will insist on compliance with existing international treaties in all cases. At the same time, we acknowledge the increasingly important role of voluntary codes of conduct: a flexible and less formal instrument based goodwill, which means that the parties are genuinely willing to comply.
on unsafe suppliers of the products and services we need to operate our critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. We will encourage active public-private cooperation in improving our resilience to internal and external threats and identifying and reducing risks. We will develop and maintain, across our public and private spheres, shared situational awareness regarding hazardous economic actors, including the possibility to share sensitive unclassified information.

73. Czechia wants to ensure a secure and affordable supply of gas, oil, and oil products as well as other relevant commodities from reliable and secure suppliers. We intend to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build our raw material infrastructure remains operational. We must avoid situations where a dominant supplier has the opportunity to gain direct leverage over our economy (including the main macromarine indicators such as inflation) just by hiking up the prices of important energy feedstock, even if the supply itself remains physically secure. Cyber security is becoming a vital aspect in the energy sector. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to ensure that our critical infrastructure remains operational. We must avoid situations where a dominant supplier has the opportunity to gain direct leverage over our economy. We encourage households and private businesses to build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks. The energy sector is the mainstay of our economy. We need to diversify the supply routes and to efficiently build up emergency stocks.

VI. Areas of strategic concern

a. Czechia's place in international relations

75. Czechia’s ties with allies and partners are essential to our independence, sovereignty, and economic prosperity. The core task for our diplomacy is to foster an international environment conducive to Czechia’s security interests.

76. A credible, confident, and effective foreign policy must be grounded in a broader political and social consensus on what our country’s main interests actually are. It must accept that we have to promote these interests over long time scales and to invest human and financial resources for this purpose. The exercise of foreign policy is the remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government. The President of the Czech Republic and the two parliamentary chambers have an indispensable role to play. To ensure that the Czechia is recognised internationally as a solid and credible partner, all these actors must share the loyalty to the main values and directions of our foreign policy, and they must speak with one voice.

77. NATO and EU membership multiplies Czechia’s political and economic importance and protects us from aggressive forces in the international environment. If we are to reap the full benefits, it is all-important that the two organisations continue to stand firmly together and that we continue to have friendly and future-oriented relations with allies, including our neighbours, and efficient Central European cooperation formats. Czechia supports ongoing NATO and EU enlargement processes in the interests of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space.

78. The Czech Republic is aware of the crucial importance of security, stability, and development in countries in Europe’s neighbourhood. The key region in this regard is Eastern Europe. Czechia will support the war-torn Ukraine and assist with its renewal as a matter of priority. We will also be active in Africa and the Middle East, especially in the countries where we can build on our historic presence. Ongoing polarisation of world politics is yet another reason why it is increasingly important to develop relations with the countries of these two regions. In today’s globalized world, Czechia looks for multi-layered relations with like-minded democracies in all regions, including the distant ones. We give special attention to our partners in the Asia-Pacific region, an emerging world trade hub that, nevertheless, suffers from the tensions caused by China’s increasingly assertive conduct.

79. Czechia is one of the world’s most developed economies. Experence of totalitarian rule and the transition to democracy is part of our identity. Timely humanitarian aid, targeted development and transition cooperation, and consistent human rights advocacy are elements of our bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy. All of these makes up our key role in international relations and contribute to the good name of Czechia as a country that has shouldered its share of responsibility for the future of the world.

b. Czechia’s defence and the tasks of our armed forces

80. The cornerstone of our defence is NATO’s collective defence system and our active engagement in it. We contribute to the collective defence capabilities of the Alliance. We systematically build the national capabilities that enable our armed forces to take part in NATO deterrence activities and in the planning and conduct of collective defence operations. We maintain and develop our capability to deploy forces on NATO, EU, UN, and coalition-led crisis management operations, including post-crisis operations, stabilisation operations, capacity building operations, counter-terrorism operations, and humanitarian operations.

81. In situations of an attack on Czechia and in situations that trigger the collective defence commitment, the core task for our armed forces would be to conduct, in cooperation with our allies, a prolonged high-intensity military conflict against a technologically advanced adversary both within and outside Czechia’s territory. Our State and society as a whole must prepare for that possibility.

82. In addition, Czechia builds its capability to independently deploy its armed forces outside our territory on rescue operations or missions to evacuate our nationals from vulnerable regions. In exceptional cases, Czech Army capacities may be deployed in Czechia to deal with natural disasters, industrial accidents, and other emergencies, provided that the deployment does not impair our defence capability.

Building defence capabilities

83. To be fit for these tasks, the Czech Army must be a combined forces army: a combination of robust capabilities and heavy military equipment with advanced technological capabilities, including efficient utilisation of emerging and disruptive technologies.

84. Participation in the collective defence system does not relieve Czechia of its responsibility to develop the capabilities necessary for the defence of our own territory. Our national arrangements include, most importantly, air defence capabilities, protection of critical infrastructure, and defence against hybrid interference including cyber threats, manipulative information campaigns, and attempts to influence or paralyse our decision-making processes. Czechia has bolstered the defence and safeguarding arms of its intelligence services in order to implement the arrangements for defence against hybrid interference and to ensure timely identification of strategic threats.

85. Another important defence task is to maintain a complete and reliable national system of support for the Alliance’s collective deterrence and defence operations in our territory. The question of military mobility, including support for the movements of allied armed forces in our territory, becomes highly relevant because of
our geographical position within the NATO area. Some aspects of military mobility are outside the Defence Ministry’s remit and require the cooperation of other bodies of the State and public administration.

86. Czechia continuously modernises the equipment used by its armed forces. We acquire and maintain sufficient stocks of ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and other material necessary in a prolonged high-intensity conflict.

87. Czechia’s defence system has combat deployment capability, including the necessary manpower and material mobilisation capability. We continue to develop all the requisite elements. We build our defence capabilities in each operational domain—on land, in the air, in cyber space and outer space—with an emphasis on interoperability in defence and military operations. We develop our national deterrence capabilities, and we contribute to the Alliance’s deterrence policy combining conventional and nuclear capabilities. Czechia will remain an active participant in NATO’s nuclear policy and planning. We will contribute to the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence as a non-nuclear ally.

Defence resources and the role of industry

88. To sustain our defence capability and active role in the collective defence system, we need sufficient financial resources. Czechia increases its defence spending in accordance with our national needs, NATO commitments and solidarity with allies. Our defence budget will reach the 2 percent of GDP goal by 2024, and it will remain at or above this level thereafter. The 2 percent of GDP threshold is safeguarded in national legislation. In fact, Czechia may yet have to spend much more in order to meet its defence needs in the years to come.

89. The industrial base, especially the domestic defence industry, plays an indispensable part in the defence effort. Industrial capacities and technological innovations are one of the key enablers of defence capability. The steps we are taking to safeguard Czechia’s security interests must necessarily include promotion of Czech defence and security industries as suppliers to our armed forces and other security structures. Similarly, the process of building and maintaining State material reserves benefits our defence industry as it helps preserve and develop the capabilities and production capacities necessary to regularly restock the reserves and provide mobilisation supplies. The State material reserves system ensures that the range and volume of our oil product stocks is sufficient to meet the needs of Czechia’s defence and security forces as well as the needs of any allied forces present in Czechia’s territory in connection with NATO collective defence and deterrence.

Whole-of-society factors for defence capability

90. A country’s defence requires an integrated approach. Responsibility for Czechia’s defence capability does not fall on the Ministry of Defence and armed forces alone. Defence is the responsibility of all bodies of the State, the whole public administration system, and the whole of society. What also matters very much is to get our people prepared for and involved in defence, to promote military traditions, to enhance the social standing of armed forces personnel and civil servants, and to use strategic communication effectively. This is where the education system comes in with its own contribution to defence preparations. It develops our military, security, and technical expertise, and it prepares our society to do their part for our country’s defence.

91. Czechia actively builds the non-military elements of its defence capability, especially in the context of NATO commitments that require us to improve the resilience of our state and society. The Alliance identifies seven baseline requirements for national resilience: (1) assured continuity of government, (2) resilient energy supplies, (3) ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, (4) resilient water and food resources, (5) ability to deal with mass casualties, (6) resilient civil communications systems, and (7) resilient transport systems. On this
c. Cyber security

92. Czechia's cyber security system involves a broad range of actors from the public, private, and academic spheres. Cyber space, by its nature, puts every actor under constant pressure to adapt to a dynamically changing environment. A common approach to cyber security—coordinated, effective, proactive, and based on an integrated cyber threat prevention, detection, and response system—continuously improves the resilience of information infrastructures crucial to the State. Cyber security is a cross-cutting issue, and a whole-of-government approach is the best practice in countering cyber threats. Accordingly, each body of the State, across the broad spectrum, should have the expertise to deal with these challenges within its respective remit. The national authority coordinating all the actors is the National Cyber and Information Security Agency.

93. Cyber space must remain global, open, stable, reliable, and secure. Czechia must continue to assist with the development of the legal standards and policies promoting these aspects. We will encourage our partner countries to adopt a united approach fostering a responsible conduct of States in cyber space. An important challenge is to develop the capabilities and capacities that enable us to prevent, detect, respond, and respond to hostile cyber activity and to attribute attacks if necessary. The cyber attacker still enjoys the advantages of comparative anonymity, plausible deniability, and asymmetric operations. Even a small group of actors can use cyber space to cause damage with strategic implications.

94. In addition to resilient infrastructure, cyber resilience requires continuous and systematic education of all social groups on the secure use of cyber space. Czechia has a shortage of cyber security experts. The State together with other actors must make every effort to enlarge our expert pool.

d. Economic security

95. The economic security dimension of protracted high-intensity conflicts adds even more importance to the development of industrial, technological, and research capacities and know-how in areas crucial to the functioning of our State and economy. Czechia's security interests require that bodies of the State occupy positions of influence in strategic companies vital to the very functioning of our economy. The State's ownership rights in partly state-owned companies must be exercised efficiently and with the benefit of expert knowledge.

96. Digitisation is an enabler for efficiency, competitiveness, and environmental sustainability in all sectors of our economy. Czechia's security, economic development, social cohesion, and stability require us to enforce the principles of digital security whenever digital solutions are used.

97. Secure research, development, and deployment of new technologies is crucial in driving our future economic growth. The Government will foster an innovative and secure environment for cutting-edge research and development. There will be appropriately targeted financial support for technology projects with potential strategic implications, including projects with heightened risk factors such as higher degrees of sensitivity in relation to hazardous entities.

98. Economic security and technological development require efficient use of human resources and funds and a robust education system. The Czech Republic and the EU must aspire to get to the top of the technological world. We must avoid technological cooperation with actors who use advanced technologies to compromise our security interests and undermine international cooperation and rules-based order.

99. Public-private cooperation benefits all its actors. The public sector gains valuable experience and knowledge from the private sector. The secure communication and information exchange cycle is mutually reinforcing. To this end, the Government will facilitate targeted communication on security issues between the public administration system and the academic, non-governmental, and private sectors. The public administration system will work together with the private sector to move towards a shared perception of threats and to assist companies as they adapt to the new environment. The strategic goal is to build relations and ties with the private sector so that the State has private sector partners to rely on in emergencies, including the opportunity to use the full potential and capacities of Czech companies as necessary.

100. The current technological development and increasing complexity of the topics places even higher demands on the quality of the State's employees responsible for decisions with long-term socio-economic implications. We must further improve the way we build the competences of such employees through theoretical and practical training, including training designed to raise their awareness of the manifestations and impacts of security threats. Decisions relevant to the secure functioning and development of our economy should be preceded by a thorough analysis based on sound input data and indicators. To this end, we must create and develop multidisciplinary research capacities combining technical, technological, and social science expertise, with socio-economic, industrial, technological, and security research at the core.

101. To provide a stable energy environment, the State must utilise all competitive energy sources contributing to Czechia's energy independence, while taking into consideration the environmental aspects. The relevant industries will need to adapt to such sources. The Government will take steps towards building new energy sources, especially the renewable and nuclear ones. Moreover, to have a sustainable and well-functioning economy, we should become more energy efficient. To this end, the Government will support energy efficiency projects of the private sector.

Further development of the Energy Consultation and Information Centres network along with promotion of responsible consumer attitudes towards sustainability will also contribute to this goal.

102. Economic development is contingent on the resilience of crucial infrastructure. We will make our electricity grid even more resilient and prepare it for an increasing influx of renewable energy, safe integration of community energy sources, and development of smart networks. We will improve the resilience of the cross-border elements of our transmission networks. An equally important concern is security of the energy system as a coherent whole, especially the cyber security aspect, including the need to redefine critical energy infrastructure. We will update our national emergency management legislation to reflect the changed conditions.

103. We will define the essential infrastructures that do not fit within the definition of critical infrastructure (for example, in the health care, social services, and education sectors) to ensure that their energy and fuel needs are taken into account. We will also determine the responsibilities of each regional and municipal authority in the process of elaborating local energy resilience
programmes for energy supply as well as for heat and fuel supply.

104. The State pays great attention to our water infrastructure. A holistic approach to water security encompasses the entire supply chain: catchment situation, water abstraction, treatment, storage, and distribution to consumers. We must review the risks regularly, including in response to the threats of extreme hydrometeorological events caused by climate change, as well as changes caused by human activity in water protection zones. We must effectively subsidise system-wide measures intended to efficiently interconnect water infrastructures, diversify water sources, integrate new sources in the system, optimise drinking water storage capacities, and modernise and develop water supply and sewage systems.

105. Food security is vital to the functioning of our society and healthy development of our population. Our State maintains a reasonable food security level. Czechia's entire population has access to sufficient quantities of affordable and nutritious food presenting no risk to human and public health. To attain and sustain this reasonable food security level, the State promotes the development of Czech agricultural and food supply chains. This involves taking measures of economic, diplomatic, environmental, and oversight nature. Absolute food security, meaning absolute food self-sufficiency, is unattainable. Czechia's territory cannot produce the required quantities of every basic agricultural and food commodity. To attain the highest possible food security level, the State concentrates on those commodities that can reasonably be produced in Czechia's natural and economic conditions. In this context, the State seeks to protect the soil from degradation and inappropriate use in order to promote biodiversity and water retention in the landscape. The State, acting through the State material reserves system, will adjust the food stocks held in the system as required to keep the population supplied in a food crisis.

106. Strategic reserves help us withstand the impacts of unforeseen events. Our State material reserves system is now at the operational readiness level. If the situation changes, we will have to reconsider the range and volume of the stocks. Another concern is to find ways to motivate our private sector and individuals to build up strategic and household stocks in anticipation of a security crisis or disruption of supply chains to ensure that our economy would continue to function smoothly.

The international dimension and the sourcing of inputs for secure functioning of our economy

107. The openness of the Czech economy means that when we try to ensure the security of our internal economic environment, the international dimension inevitably comes into play. More often than not, the Czech economy faces threats and risks of an international nature coming from state as well as non-state actors.

108. Czechia must have the capability to actively prevent and deal with economic coercion and influence operations in the multilateral trading system. We must counteract the efforts of some state and non-state actors who use non-legitimate methods to gain economic or technological advantage, cause damage to private businesses or academic and research institutions, and even to compromise specific interests of Czechia. The key is to have in place robust institutional support (including human resources) for the mechanisms that keep our open environment secure for trade and investment. Examples may include the foreign investment screening mechanism, the planned security screening of supply chains, the application of sanction regimes, export licencing, and the EU’s planned anti-coercion instrument.

109. In terms of economic security, our main interest is to diversify our supply chains, improve their quality, make them more stable and secure, and to become less dependent on strategic supplies. Czechia’s economy is heavily reliant on access to sources of energy, raw materials, and other key inputs. Our first concern will be to gain secure access to the inputs necessary to maintain our defence capability and national security, including inputs for our defence and security industries. The support provided (and constantly improved) by the State, together with raw material diplomacy, will enable us to replace supplies of energy feedstock and other raw material from Russia and other authoritarian or unstable countries with supplies from reliable partners. Diversity of markets will make it easier for our companies to find alternative suppliers. Diversified exports and a greater degree of internationalisation will lessen our economic dependencies and help us redirect our exports whenever we lose an export market. The Government will share the available information with Czech businesses to reduce the risks of business presence in markets rife with security problems. In view of the energy transition, increasing digitisation, electrification, and new production trends, our strategic aim is to radically expand the range of strategic commodities held in the State material reserves system. This concerns especially commodities necessary for our arms, steel, and battery manufacturers and other economically important Czech businesses.

110. Energy security depends not only on the diversification of sources, but also on the development of national and European infrastructures for the transport of energy feedstock. The development of infrastructure enabling consistent high-capacity transport of LNG will be an important part of our efforts to stabilise energy supply. The Government has solutions to replace Russian oil imports: the TAL-PLUS project to increase the capacity of the TAL pipeline for oil supply to Czechia, the Adria pipeline for oil shipped via the Adriatic Sea terminals, and the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline for oil shipped via the Black Sea terminals. A concern of strategic importance is that the oil stocks held in our State material reserves system should consist predominantly of alternatives to the sulphur-rich Russian oil.

111. Our energy security will also benefit from the development and use of new technologies such as high-capacity energy storage systems and the use of hydrogen, including the building of hydrogen producing and utilising infrastructures.
e. Internal security

112. Internal security and civil protection require a whole-of-government approach. The Ministry of the Interior has the key, though not sole, responsibility for the process, and there are a number of other actors, each with its own specific responsibilities. Czechia’s internal security requires a united approach and a uniform state policy. The Ministry of the Interior’s role is to make our state and society resilient to the threats. To this end, the Government will regularly analyse the internal security developments. The results of the analysis will inform our choice of priorities, each priority being allocated the appropriate capacities.

113. Czechia’s internal security must be seen in the context of global, especially European, developments. It is inseparable from the security of Europe. Europe’s security influences Czechia’s security directly as well as indirectly. This means that the answers to many of our security problems must be searched for at the EU level. Many of the threats to our internal security originate elsewhere, a fact to which our internal security policy must give considerable weight.

114. The Ministry of the Interior is the central body of the State responsible for internal affairs, including public order and some areas of internal order and security: crime prevention, road safety, possession of arms and ammunition, migration and asylum, fire protection, crisis management, civil emergency planning, civil protection, integrated rescue system, and the administrative penalties procedure. It operates the communication networks serving our security and rescue mechanisms. It supports the public administration system to work in the optimal way and to be resilient—a function highly relevant to our internal security. The Ministry of the Interior has an important role to play in preventing and suppressing hybrid threats and in building our resilience to the influence of foreign powers.

115. The Government will pay increased attention to the threats that affect our internal security on a country-wide scale and are associated with other security concerns. In these cases, the Government will use the whole-of-society approach. The threats include interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs and functioning of our state and our public administration at large, in our political or economic decision-making processes and our information environment, influence of foreign powers on our free society, as well as dangerous manipulation of information, extremism, radicalisation, and terrorism. These threats exploit the vulnerabilities of the democratic rule of law to gain control over the political and economic life of our democratic republic with the assistance of internal actors. The activities aim to progressively undermine the foundations of our democratic state. We must use all legitimate means to stave them off.

116. The steps taken by the Government to safeguard our internal security interests will involve engaging in international cooperation mainly within the EU and NATO, working together with our civil society as well as business and academic communities, improving public awareness and education, monitoring and analysing the security situation, exchanging information, coordinating the bodies of the state, utilising the State’s strategic communication, making the public administration system more resilient to the threats, and consistently enforcing law. The Government will have to allocate sufficient capacities for these purposes.

117. Migration has increasing security implications in the European as well as national contexts. This is partly due to its increasingly strong association with security threats such as organised crime, human trafficking, and terrorism. Another reason is the surging migration flow driven by economic reasons and regional conflicts and increasingly also by the effects of climate change. Last but not least, this is due to the way some international actors instrumentalize migration. Czechia’s migration policy will prevent and efficiently address the negative phenomena associated with migration, and it will mitigate the impacts. It is important to use a preventive approach in the potential source countries of the migration flows. It is also necessary to pay attention to the transit countries affected by the massive movements of people. The core task is to consistently protect the EU’s external border and to build the EU’s resilience by efficiently managing the crucial mechanisms of its migration policy. The number and structure of immigrants residing in Czechia’s territory must reflect the benefits they bring to our country as well as our country’s absorption capacity. A successful migration policy requires thorough monitoring, timely identification of the risk phenomena, flexibility, and rapid response to emerging trends. It must be underpinned by functioning administrative, judicial, and national relief processes. Last but not least, it must be allocated sufficient capacities.

f. Civil protection and crisis management

118. The crime prevention and suppression system protects individuals as well as communities. Its role also involves protecting and assisting crime victims, especially the most vulnerable ones. The key criterion for a state’s credibility is whether the people feel secure as well as confident that the state is taking care of their local security situation. Accordingly, the Government will see to it that security institutions work consistently at the local level and will provide them with the necessary support in terms of legislation, policies, guidance, and funding. Internal security is vulnerable to the impacts of serious general and economic crime, organised crime and corruption, and the increasingly widespread and sophisticated online crime. Here, the Government must keep its priorities under review to reflect the emerging new forms, means and modalities for the fight against crime. The key is to bolster our capacities for combating violent, online, and property-related crime. Last but not least, we must consistently fight hate crime and stand up against verbal and physical manifestations of hatred, including attacks on democratic values, because hatred radicalises, fragments, undermines, and destabilises societies.

119. A functioning criminal justice system able to flexibly respond to changing security risks is another crucial enabler for internal security. The Government must keep tailoring the system’s capacity to the current needs, and it must protect judicial independence from any interference. Only an independent judicial system, resilient to outside influences, can hand down just and fair rulings to promote confidence in the democratic rule of law and in a state that delivers security for its people.

120. Czechia will ensure that the bodies responsible for internal security have the human resources, organisational, material, and technological capacities they need to efficiently perform these functions and adequately prevent and deal with the security phenomena.

121. The Ministry of Interior’s responsibility is to make our state and society resilient to crimes of non-military nature. This involves coordinating the non-military crisis management system, and building the expertise needed to plan, prepare, coordinate and align the roles of public authorities and private stakeholders. Upcoming legislative changes will facilitate the development of the State’s single crisis management documentation reflecting the changed security environment. The Ministry of the Interior will continue to improve the crisis management tools, especially the national crisis management information system.

122. Resilient critical infrastructure provides essential support for the vital functions of the State. The Government will consider new developments relating to critical infrastructure protection in the light of EU legislation. It will review the criteria for determining which infrastructures are critical and expand the rights and duties of state bodies and other critical infrastructure actors. The Government will initiate a legislative change to consolidate and bring under one act the rules for critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. This will optimise our crisis management system and improve the resilience of the State and private stakeholders in managing crisis situations.

123. We need to develop our civil protection system in a way reflecting the trends in the security
124. In crisis situations, the Government uses a system of emergency economic measures (coordinated by the State Material Reserves Administration) to facilitate supplies of the necessary material in cases where responsibility for supplying the material rests with bodies at any level of the crisis management system and the material cannot be obtained in a standard way.

125. Czechia builds the non-military elements of its defence capability, especially in the context of our commitment to meeting NATO’s baseline requirements for resilience of our state and society. We utilise and help develop the EU Civil Protection Mechanism for disaster prevention, preparedness, and response. This also involves having in place civil protection means and arrangements. Czechia has set out to improve its all-hazards response capability.

126. Czechia’s security interests require us to pay strategic attention to many other areas, such as environmental protection, pandemic security, social cohesion, societal security, protection of the rule of law, supply chain security, and food security.

127. We need a whole-of-society effort to reduce the risk of human-made and natural disasters, and to adapt to climate change. The main coordinator is the Ministry of the Environment. The Ministry of the Environment’s core strategy documents, based on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, include the Environmental Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2021-2030 with outlook to 2050, Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change in the Czech Republic, and the State Environmental Policy of the Czech Republic 2030 with outlook to 2050. The Ministry of the Environment has developed basic emergency management documentation for newly defined emergency situations such as floods, flash floods, heavy rainfall, extreme heat, extreme wind, and leakage of hazardous chemicals from stationary facilities. It continues to improve the early warning system for events such as heatwaves, extreme wind and high-danger fire weather conditions. The Ministry of the Environment has a say in the selection of topics for research relevant to climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. On the other hand, issues such as cooperation with developing countries in the area of resilience building and disaster risk reduction, international data and technology exchange, and the building of international early warning and timely response systems are within the remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

128. The State’s core duty is to protect the lives and health of its population not only in pandemic situations. However, the State can never succeed in this unless every one of us cooperates and takes responsibility for himself or herself and for others. The Ministry of Health is the central body of the State responsible for health services, including public health. It builds a resilient health care system prepared to manage great patient loads without compromising on the standards of health care. This involves establishing an early warning system and information flow pathways, preparing for threats with health care impacts, developing procedures for in-country and cross-border transfers of patients, maintaining sufficient stocks of PPE, medical equipment and medicines, developing procedures to increase staff numbers, delivering security for the staff and patients, ensuring cyber security, and other related measures.

129. Our quest for a cohesive and secure society confronts us with diverse challenges such as to eradicate poverty, narrow the social gap, protect vulnerable groups, integrate immigrants, and to make our people feel more secure. This is where the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs comes in, and where the education system must again do its part: namely to introduce citizenship education and media education curricula. Another necessary element is the State’s strategic communication with local government and cultural policies that are combined with policies to bolster our civil society at large.

Concluding note

130. This Security Strategy is the result of cooperation among a number of ministries and institutions. The authors applied the whole-of-government approach to the text, which has improved our understanding of the breadth and complexity of security policy. On issuing the Security Strategy, the Government undertakes to continue developing this holistic approach.